Russian Economy
ACADEMY ECONOMISTS BACK DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.
The economic section of the Russian Academy of
Sciences on 29 January
approved a strategic plan for the country's development through 2010,
ITAR-TASS reported. The strategy itself was developed by a working group under the State
Council's
Presidium at the order of President Putin and under the chairmanship of
Khabarovsk Krai Governor Viktor Ishaev. Ishaev said that the plan anticipates the growth
of the
country's middle class to 50-55 percent of the population to allow for
sustainable economic growth and the shrinking of the percentage of people living below
subsistence levels to
10-15 percent. PG -RFERL_NEWSLINE- 30 JANUARY 2001
For more on the ISHAYEV REPORT see ECAAR-RUSSIA
Newsletter #4 on this site
__________________________________________________________________________
Cheap
workforce, not high oil prices, will cause economic growth
Interview on strana.ru with Viktor Ivanter -17.01.01. 14:19
The high economic growth in 2000 was caused mainly by a "confidence element" and not by high raw material prices in the world, says Viktor Ivanter, director of the Economic Forecast Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences. "I can prove that the money gained from oil prices was not spent on the economy… The main growth factors are that we kept back the prices set by the natural monopolies and that the population agreed to work for lower payment," Ivanter said.
Russia's State Statistics Committee said in preliminary information that the GDP increased 7.7% during nine months of 2000. Industrial output growth in January to November last year was 9.6%. The academician warned that when money would be invested in the capital stock, the growth rate may decline substantially. But further on Russia may reach a steady 5-6% annual growth rate.
Economic growth in 2000 could have exceeded 7%, should the government have a clear-cut economic program. Ivanter believes that if the government had an economic strategy in 2000 and if its first phase stimulated investment in working capital, economic growth could have been 10% to 12%. "We have not yet started the first phase with a clear purpose but approach it in a spontaneous way. Otherwise we would have not 7% (of growth) but more," he said.
Speaking about the debt problem, Ivanter said debts should be paid back but "our payments should correspond to our export relationships." According to the forecasts made by the Economic Forecast Institute, at present Russia can pay $8-9 billion annually, if raw material prices remain on an average level. And this sum includes total payments and not only the debts to the Paris Club, he stressed.
"We should tell our partners the payment of what sum we guarantee. Then the solution of the problem will be of a technical character." Ivanter noted in this context that "there are no examples in the world of any country fully repaying its a state debt," with the exception of Romania.
At present, Ivanter's institute is working on a strategy of Russia's development for a period until 2010 on a request of the State Council. The strategy is to be submitted for the president's consideration in February this year.
© National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000.
Foreign Ministry:
Russia-U.S. trade grows steadily but still not up to potential
03.02.01. 13:55
Russia-U.S. trade reached $10.2 billion in 2000, or 1.36 times more than in 1999, Russia Foreign Ministry's spokesman said Friday. In this context Russia enjoys a surplus approaching the $6-billion mark.
The United States is "in the lead among investor countries in the amount of direct investments into the Russian economy," the spokesman said. "As of December 2000 their total sum was estimated at $8.5 billion, of which $7 billion are direct investments," he added.
"The main portion of the U.S. investments is in Russia's fuel and energy complex (about 60%. - Foreign Ministry), there is a number of big projects implemented in the aerospace, mining, food, and some other industries," he specified.
At the same time, "The level of trade and economic cooperation - Russia, for example, accounts for less than 0.5% of the U.S. foreign trade turnover - is not yet up to both countries' real potential," he stated.
"This disproportion might be corrected by the removal of barriers, including renunciation of the practice of discriminatory anti-dumping investigations in respect of a number of Russian products, primarily steel," he opined.
"High on the agenda are also the extension to the Russian economy of the market status under the U.S. trade legislation, the repeal of the notorious Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which blocks the granting to Russia of a normal trade treatment on the permanent and unconditional basis, and cancellation of restrictions on delivery to Russia of certain types of U.S. high technology products," he said.
_____________________________________________________________
Nation Missile Defense
NMD: Russian and US Statements and Analysis
The following information appeared on http://eng.strana.ru/foreign/
Please visit that site to keep abreast of Russian views on Security
issues.
U.S. NMD may
present a threat to Russia's strategic forces
02.02.01. 18:47
It is not ruled out that in future the U.S. National Missile Defense system, which Washington intends to deploy, may be used against Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles just because no one else has such weapons, considers Valery Manilov, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
In his view, the Americans have all technological, economic, financial and manufacturing possibilities fully to deploy its NMD, even if limited changes are made in the 1972 ABM Treaty and if a limited use is made of the NMD at the initial stage.
In the event of Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the start of the deployment the National Missile Defense system, Manilov stressed, Russia will take appropriate actions that it can afford.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000. http://eng.strana.ru/.
Russian
experts analyze U.S. NMD plans
02.02.01. 17:23
Russian experts have decided to scrupulously analyze America's plans to deploy a national missile defense system (NMD). They plan to do that not only from the military-technical aspect but from the military-political aspect as well.
Already on February 5, the experts are to hold hearings in Moscow on this subject that is of vital significance to Russia's security. Specialists in the sphere of military-technical policy, political scientists, experts from Russian scientific and research centers, academic institutes, as well as a wide range of non-governmental organizations dealing with such problems are to participate in the hearings.
The experts intend to examine the military, technical and political aspects of America's plans to build NMD. They will also analyze the combat capabilities of the new generation of ICBMs, the basis strategic concepts and architecture of NMD, specifications of NMD elements and the international consequences stemming from the deployment of such a system.
This is yet one more method for convincing the U.S. Administration that Washington's departure from the 1972 ABM Treaty is a mistake that can be avoided.
The First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Valery Manilov pointed out on Friday that Russia, as a big power, was just as responsible for strategic stability as the United States. Russia tables a constructive and reasonable alternative to America's departure from the 1972 ABM Treaty and Washington's decision to build NMD - namely, to create a non-strategic missile defense system in the "danger" directions.
In Manilov's opinion, threats of ballistic missile strikes on America by countries with unstable regimes cannot be anticipated within the next 10-15 years. But even if one allows that such a hypothetical threat emerges, then it will be nullified by a non-strategic missile defense system. Such a system could be deployed in Europe and the Asian-Pacific region with the participation of all interested countries.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000. http://eng.strana.ru/.
Europe in no
mood to back U.S. plan to create national missile defense system
02.02.01. 15:39
High-ranking officials representing three European countries have been speaking about U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense system.
In Moscow Germany's Foreign Minister Rudolf Scharping gave it to understand he was against any breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty because it could upset the world's balance of strategic forces.
At a press conference in Turin French President Jacques Chirac and Italy's head of state Giuliano Amato spoke in the same vein after a round of talks. The French president noted that NMD would inevitably trigger a new arms race, adding that U.S. defense spending could be use to fund development programs for Third World countries. Italy's premier said the U.S. plan might jeopardize the unity of the North-Atlantic Alliance.
The Danish Foreign Minister expressed the view that the new U.S. administration should discuss the subject in detail with its NATO allies before taking a decision to deploy NMD.
Following recent talks with his British counterpart in London the Danish Foreign Minister stressed Washington could only implement its idea of creating a missile shield if it had Russian support and in consultation with China. A possible impact on disarmament agreements should also be taken into account.
He was apprehensive of the risk of the idea of creating NMD being misinterpreted in the world, which might provoke a new arms race.
Norwegian leaders have spoken in similar terms about the U.S. plan.
Nevertheless, George W. Bush believes he could convince Russia's president of the need for NMD during a face-to-face meeting with him.
Bush would like to tell Russia that the purpose of the development of NMD is not to create a world where the United States would be the only superpower and that advocates of NMD in the United States are pursuing the goal of creating a stable world where nobody could target them, their allies or Russia itself.
It is not yet clear whether the U.S. president will be able to convince his Russian counterpart but Moscow is already in a position to propose a whole range of political and diplomatic measures as an alternative to NMD.
These include the establishment of a Moscow-based center to exchange information on missile launches (cosponsored by Russia and the United States) and a proposal for the establishment of a global system of control over the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies.
Besides, Russia is in favor of broad international cooperation on theater (non-strategic) ABM, which is already at work as a result of a number of agreements Moscow and Washington have reached in the past three years. This kind of cooperation is open to all states.
The purpose of the alternative measures suggested by Moscow is to preserve the ABM Treaty and remove the concerns of the United States and other countries with regard to so-called new missile threats.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru,2000.http://eng.strana.ru/
China opposes
deployment of U.S. national missile defense system
02.02.01. 14:11
China has once again called upon the U.S. government to alter its plans for deploying a national missile defense system (NMD) that could lead to irreversible consequences and upset the strategic balance in the world.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman has made it clear that America's plans run counter to the entire course of history and jeopardize world peace. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's statement was made several days after another similar statement from Russia.
Just like Moscow, Beijing warns the United States that the deployment of NMD threatens the 1972 ABM Treaty and that this could trigger a new arms race.
That is why China urges the United States to heed the demands of the international community and reject its militarist plans since the 1972 ABM Treaty is the cornerstone for preserving stability in the world and continuing disarmament.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000. http://eng.strana.ru/
U.S. Defense
Secretary sets out to convince NATO allies that national missile defense system is needed
02.02.01. 13:42
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld arrives in Germany today. This is his first overseas trip as head of the Defense Department. The pretext for his trip to Europe, at first glance, seems trivial - to participate in the traditional international conference on security issues in Munich. In reality, everything is much more serious.
The new U.S. Administration has decided to take its first step in foreign politics not in the direction of Russia, but in the opposite direction. Having reaffirmed that it had serious intentions to back out of the 1972 ABM Treaty and having set its mind to build a new national missile defense system (NMD), Washington hoped to finalize at the beginning of the new century the status of America's exclusive superiority over all the rest of the countries in the world, and first of all, over its main rival - Russia. By taking this step, the new Administration hoped, at the same time, to rally all its allies still more closely around itself.
But it did not turn out that way: the allies failed to understand and did not share America's plans. And that is the reason why they have to be convinced. That is the reason why the U.S. Defense Secretary has flown to Munich to start brainwashing European NATO partners who think otherwise.
The White House envoy intends to persuade the allies into believing that their opinions will be taken into consideration when the U.S. shapes out its strategic security program. But at the same time, the Pentagon chief will make it quite clear that America firmly intends to stick to its steady course aimed at deploying a national missile defense system.
Proceeding from all this, one may conclude that if some of the allies turns a deaf ear to America's arguments and decides to stick to their own opinions, then they will simply be ignored.
In the same manner, the Americans intend to deal with Russia. However, they forget one thing, namely they involuntarily unite against themselves all those whom they intend to ignore.
This time, the Defense Secretary is going to persuade his main allies. He is to meet with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the defense ministers of Germany, Great Britain and Italy, the General Secretary and Supreme Commander of the NATO forces.
On Saturday Rumsfeld is to address the Munich conference devoted to security policy. The Secretary of Russia's Security Council Sergei Ivanov will also make a speech at the conference.
And that will be the first duel between Russia and the United States on the missile defense problem.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000. http://eng.strana.ru/
Sergei Ivanov
to start dialogue on ABM with U.S.
02.02.01. 12:16
The city of Munich in Bavaria, Germany, is to host,from February 2 through 4, the traditional conference on security, which will be attended by countries of Europe, the United States and Canada.
Russia will be represented by Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, who is to deliver a report.
Presumably, the conference may become the first international forum, where Russia and the United States will for the first time cross swords in a public debate over the further fate of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Given that it is not only Russia but also many other countries that do not support the U.S. decision to modernize the national missile defense system, the discussion will certainly involve delegations of other states.
The Munich Conference will see not only "a first serious dialogue with the new U.S. Administration on the ABM problems," said Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitry Rogozin. It was not inconceivable, in his view, that the conferees would get down to a serious discussion of the idea of forming a European security system with Russia's participation.
Specifically, FRG Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, FRG Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, NATO Secretary General George Robertson, and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will attend the Conference.
(c) National Information Service Strana.Ru,
2000. http://eng.strana.ru/.
SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY WARNS OF NEW ARMS RACE
In a speech to a NATO security conference in Munich on 4 February, Sergei Ivanov said that "the destruction of the ABM treaty will result in the annihilation of the whole structure of strategic stability and create the prerequisites for a new arms race including in outer space," Reuters reported. But if the U.S. stays within that treaty's limitations, Ivanov said, Moscow is prepared to negotiate even deeper cuts in strategic arms. In other comments, Ivanov said that the Taliban currently maintains 30 training camps for "terrorist commandos from Central Asian, Arab, and European countries." He also called on Western countries to "demonstrate understanding" for Russia's calls for debt rescheduling. "By refusing to waive part of one's profit today," Ivanov warned, "tomorrow one may get results which may turn out to be much more expensive -- and not only from the point of view of economics. As we all know, politics has to be paid for." PG (RFERL-5.02.02)
Russia
retains capability to pierce U.S. national missile defense system
strana.ru 08.02.01. 15:21
Russia will be compelled to adequately respond to America's departure from the 1972
ABM Treaty, declared an expert with the Center for International and Strategic Studies,
Yury Lebedev.
If the new U.S. Administration turns a deaf ear to the voice of the world public and violates the fundamental document on reducing offensive nuclear weapons, Russia will be compelled to resort not only to political, diplomatic but military levers of containment as well.
START-II does not prohibit arming the Topol-M missile with three independently-targeted re-entry vehicles. Such a modification of the Topol-M could be tested in record short time and put into serial production. Such a missile that has only a 2-minute launching phase against the 5-minute booster phase for the SS-18 is capable, with a higher degree of probability, of piercing a hypothetical U.S. national missile defense system even if it has a space-based echelon.
Starting with 2005-2007, Russia is to begin deploying new missile systems on the base of Yury Dolgoruky-class submarines. (In Russian, the word "dolgoruky" means "long-arm"). The Tu-95MC and Tu-160 long-range strategic bombers are to be armed with a new modification of cruise missiles. The Russian expert also pointed out that measures would be taken to modernize the combat control system, the missile attack warning system as well as the space reconnaissance system.
© National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000.
RUSSIA, US
STILL DIVIDED ON ABM ISSUES
By Sergei ISHCHENKO
Trud
February 8, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only – Johnson Russia List)]
The Cold-War ghost, which has once again been conjured by those
US intentions to deploy an NMD (National Missile Defense) system, keeps wandering between
Moscow and Washington. For his
own part, Sergei Ivanov, who serves as Secretary of the Russian Federation's National
Security Council, has said bluntly some time ago that the abrogation of the ABM
(Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty would wreck the entire system of global strategic
stability, also creating pre-requisites for yet another spiral of the arms race, a space
arms race included.
Doubtless, Washington understands only too well that the United
States is going to win such a hypothetical arms race in circum-terrestrial space. The
thing is that the cash-strapped Russia will have to sink its Mir orbital station in the
ocean already in the near future; this decision highlights our really unimpressive
financial standing.
Therefore Russia should apparently opt for a relatively cheap asymmetrical response; and such is the main pre-condition of that possible response. By all looks, Moscow would have to "retaliate" on the ground, rather than in outer space. First of all, the Russian side would be expected to install the required number of ICBM warheads making it possible to penetrate any projected US ABM system. The United States comprehended the futility of specific "Star Wars" plans back in 1972 (that is, when the ABM Treaty was inked), with mathematicians proving that it was well-nigh impossible to destroy 15,000-20,000 Soviet nuclear warheads in case of war. Russia now boasts much fewer nuclear warheads; consequently, Washington is once again tempted to obtain some unilateral strategic advantages.
Russia doesn't have enough money for
building new ICBMs in no time at all. Therefore it would become possible to install three
MIRVs (Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicles) on every Topol-M ICBM, the Russian Defense
Ministry claims. In fact, the current START-II treaty doesn't hinder such actions.
Besides, it won't take long to test those modified ICBMs. Each Topol-M ICBM replete with
three nuclear MIRVs would also have a
rather short, two-minute, boost phase. At the same time, our older ICBMs, such as the
SS-18, which has confounded US generals and politicians for quite a while now, boast a
five-minute boost phase. Consequently, Topol-M ICBMs would apparently find it much easier
to breach a projected US NMD system.
Given current appropriations, the Russian
side can begin to deploy new-generation SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles)
aboard its Yury Dolgoruky-class submarines prior to
the 2005-2007 period.
The Russian Air Force's Tupolev Tu-160 and
Tu-95-MS strategic bombers will soon be equipped with new-generation and long-range cruise
missiles. In their turn, such missiles can be fitted with conventional and nuclear
warheads alike. It's therefore no coincidence that our Tu-95-MS bombers, which were absent
in the Arctic (that provides the shortest possible "route" from our airfields to
US cities) for many consecutive
years, began to fly over the North Pole several months ago.
_______
ASSESSMENTS OF NMD DEBATE DIVIDE.
Interfax-West reported on 6 February that one member of the Russian
delegation at the
Munich international affairs conference over the weekend,
Duma International Relations Committee chairman Dmitrii
Rogozin, was extremely pleased with the sessions for another
reason. According to him, discussions in Munich showed how
tired European countries have become with what he said was
the "constant diktat" from Washington. But an article in
"Segodnya" on 5 February carried a different assessment. It
suggested that its sources have found that "nobody in
Washington or the European capitals believes in Russia's
ability to compete with the United States" and that Moscow
will be forced to agree to ABM modifications. PG (RFERL, 7.02.2001)
________
Security on a New Principle
Russia would do well to factor ABM into the balance of
nuclear deterrence
By Konstantin Cherevkov
Nezavisimaya voennoe obozrenie
February 02, 2001
[translation for personal use only – Johnson Russia List]
About the author: Konstantin Vladimirovich Cherevkov - Doctor of
Technical
Sciences, professor, and member of the Tsiolkovsky Space Academy.
Amid all of the contradictory and some times complementary interests
of
Russia, the United States and countries of Western Europe, the game’s pivotal
points are the US and Russia positions on the 1972 ABM Treaty and on the
concept of strategic balance in the 21st century.
In place of mutual nuclear deterrence, the US proposes a new
doctrine for
achieving strategic stability (first and foremost its own security), based on
the possession of an ABM system. Such a system would be intended to guarantee
survival in a multi-polar (with respect to the possession of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems) world in which there are
many potential regional conflicts.
Russia considers the US position deceptive, in that a limited ABM
capability
would be able to reduce our retaliatory strike following a preemptive
(counter-force) US strike. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the
fielding of national ABM infrastructure would allow for a [subsequent]
increase in its capabilities, to a level that would fully block our
retaliatory capability.
Under these circumstances, that the US is pushing development of a
national
ABM system. Former US President Bill Clinton’s announcement of a temporary
suspension in ABM deployment is more likely tied to the US’ technological
inability to create even a limited territorial ABM system. However it would
be na?ve to believe that a program in which $60 billion have been invested,
and for which some $100 billion is planned (up to $300 billion by some
estimates), will be discontinued.
It would seem that it is time to put the US bargaining position to
the test by
trading a system of national missile defense that will remain ephemeral in the
near term, for legal provisions that would grant Russia a substantial
quantitative and qualitative advantage in ICBMs.
However, on the official level, Russia continues to support the
“inviolability
of the ABM treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability,” proposing
balanced US-Russian reductions in nuclear weapons under a START-III treaty.
Alternatives
Game theory demonstrates that two sides may reach consensus only
where both
sides recognize that their interests are not purely antagonistic (the
so-called “zero-sum game”). There is reason to believe that these conditions
are met in relations between Russia, the US and Western European countries.
Indeed, given its location in direct contact with countries that
constitute a
belt of conflict, the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction (or using the fact of these weapons existence as a threat) is
greater than for Russia than for the US. To some extent, the same could be
said of Western European countries allied to the US in NATO.
However, whereas in Russia these threats are primarily tied to the
use of
non-strategic ballistic rockets, for the US the threat is from both strategic
(ICBM and SLBM), and operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles in
theaters of military operations in regions the US declares as spheres of
strategic interest.
Russia’s categorical refusal to accept modification of the 1972
ABM treaty
denies legitimacy to all efforts for deployment of national missile defenses.
We’ve reached a stalemate, out of which there are two exits.
1. The US, leveraging overwhelming advantage over Russia in
military-economic
potential, and desiring large-scale investment of its abundant capital in high
technology, will opt for a unilateral violation of the 1972 treaty, and
abruptly deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is
technologically feasible. The likelihood of such a step increased
significantly when George Bush’s administration came to power at the same time
as Republicans control the Congress. If events follow this path, Russia’s
international prestige will be dealt yet another heavy blow. If Russia is
forced to accept modification to the ABM Treaty in a way that suits the US,
after our categorical pronouncements of the treaty’s inviolability, it will be
a veritable act of capitulation.
2. Russia accepts the possibility of amendments to the ABM
Treaty, specifying
asymmetrical limits on the numbers and capabilities of Russian and US nuclear
arsenals under START-III (or even under START-II, taking advantage of the fact
that the US Congress has not yet ratified it).
In this way a new model for stability will be created, within which
offensive
nuclear weapons and missile defenses would be considered elements of a unitary
strategic system, providing for a balance of offensive and defensive weapons
in the US and Russia. This model establishes a treaty framework that
encompasses the US anti-missile defense and Russia’s asymmetrical response,
thereby preventing the start of a new spiral in the arms race.
Russia’s adoption of such an initiative would have great political
resonance,
in that it would serve as a litmus test for the sincerity of US intentions in
the development of national missile defenses, intended only for protection
from limited ballistic missile attacks, rather than securing a unilateral
advantage over Russia. It is in Russia’s interest to lose no time, since if
the later proves to be the case we will have a much more difficult problem.
Inference may be drawn from RF President Vladimir Putin’s remarks
at the 13
November 2000 summit in Brunai, in which he did not completely reject the idea
of negotiations. “…Russia is prepared… to continue… dialog with the US on
the
question of ABM, which has generated disagreement.” However, he also said
that US and Russian movement “toward radical lowering of nuclear warhead
ceilings… must be made under conditions which preserve and strengthen the 1972
ABM Treaty.” Such an approach to problems of offensive nuclear weapons and
anti-missile defenses seems to reflect the views (presently contradictory and
inconsistent) of Russian institutes and persons formulating the positions of
the country’s upper military-political leadership.
Questions
How feasible is the technical task of creating a balanced strategic
system of
offensive nuclear weapons and ABM systems, with national level verification of
agreed parameters to guarantee its durability? This global problem may be
broken down as follows:
1. Is it possible to select verifiable characteristics of an
ABM system that
define its capability to defend against strikes by ICBMs with a given density
and equipped with a given set of countermeasures?
2. If so, is it possible to determine a verifiable threshold
for an ABM
system that will provide protection from strikes from Third World countries on
the one hand, while guaranteeing the delivery of the required minimum number
of warheads in a Russian counterstrike on the other?
3. If so, is there a realistic way to change the
counterproductive
confrontation of "American ABM vs. Russian asymmetrical counterstrike," into a
unitary system of strategic security, reinforced by bilateral or multilateral
treaties?
4. What are the prospects for Russian participation in
international ABM
system development?
Now, let us consider possible answers for these questions, that will
determine
the feasibility of system of stable balance between strategic offensive
weapons and and ABM defenses.
Parameters
The capabilities of a national missile defense, once prepared for
deployment,
may be limited by determining:
-- The tactical-technical characteristics of the anti-missile weapon
systems
near (atmospheric) and far (extraatmospheric) intercept, including the
characteristics of launch platforms and anti-missile rockets.
-- The number and location of protected regions.
-- The number of launchers, launch installations, and anti-missile
rockets in
each region.
To counteract the possibility of covert preparation and increase in
the number
of launchers, and anti-missile rockets, procedures must be developed to
monitor their production and storage.
The possibility of further enhancement of a national ABM system by
incorporating or networking with the planned SBIRS-low system (according to
available information the system is planned for 2010) must be taken into
account trough the installation of verified limitations on the number of
satellites in the constellation (including reserves), their robustness, types
and characteristics of sensors, etc.
Thresholds
Limiting the above mentioned characteristics below a certain level,
sets a
threshold below which a national ABM system can deflect strikes of varying
density, by ballistic missiles equipped with countermeasures of varying
effectiveness.
By varying these characteristics it is possible to establish a
threshold which
ensures penetration by our counterstrike at a level that guarantees
unacceptable damage, while preserving its impenetrability in the case of a
small-scale ballistic missile attack. In determining the required density of
a counterstrike and the guaranteed minimal number of penetrating warheads, it
is necessary to consider the following conditions.
First, the same number of ballistic missiles launched in a massive
counterstrike can vary in density for various defended regions, up to a
maximum concentration of the entire strike on a single region.
Second, since the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty, there have been
changes in
the definition of "unacceptable" damage in the mutual nuclear deterrence
model. If, formerly, it was assumed that a strike must destroy a significant
portion of the military-economic potential and population of a country (in
several earlier estimates up to 50% and 30% respectively), today for civilized
countries, strikes on civilian populations are unthinkable in military
economic terms and are utterly unacceptable.
Offensive-Defensive Balance
The technical feasibility of establishing a monitored capabilities
threshold
for national missile defense creates a realistic foundation for development of
an agreement on balancing the relationship between Russian and US offensive
and defensive nuclear missile capabilities, through the establishment of an
asymmetrical quota on ICBMs, including their qualitative characteristics,
including, for example, the retention of ballistic missiles with MIRVs.
The collaboration of Russian and American experts and diplomats in
an area of
such exceptional importance for both governments will help establish an
increased level of mutual trust, which will be required for working out new
agreements in the subsequent phases, when research and testing produces a
space based echelon for the destruction of ballistic missiles in the boost
phase, using kinetic or possibly laser weapons.
ABM for Russia
Russia's strategic interests call for a territorial ABM
system. However, the
country's present economic condition does not permit independent development
of such a system.
It is not without cause that President Vladimir Putin and Defense
Minister
Igor Sergeev suggested to the US and European NATO countries that they
collaborate in the development of non-strategic ABM defenses. This is not
Russia's first suggestion to the West on this topic. In his time, Mikhail
Gorbachev, and then in 1992, Boris Yeltsin presented similar initiatives.
However, they did not meet with success and yielded practically no results
except, perhaps, creation of the Joint Data Exchange Center for sharing of
information about ballistic missile launches.
Even that in that instance, Western countries responded coolly to
the
suggestion (see: “NVO” #27, 2000), apparently seeing it largely as a political
bluff. Their skepticism is to a large degree justified in that declarations
from the Russian president and defense minister have been made on the backdrop
of unequivocal rejection of constructive dialog with the US on the question of
strategic balance between strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems in
contemporary conditions.
Incidentally, one may conclude with a high degree of certainty that
the
“details” the West is looking for would be found in a logical and consistent
Russian position on the general problem of ABM in the modern world.
In fact, effective theater ABM must have the capability to destroy
operational-tactical and tactical ballistic missiles in the boost phase (this
is precisely the kind of ABM needed in Europe). This is a much more difficult
task than destroying an ICBM in the same part of its trajectory. Therefore,
in this regard, a non-strategic ABM system would partly overlap the
capabilities of a US national ABM system.
Global Unity
Space-based communications and reconnaissance systems are
practically integral
parts of strategic or theater ABM systems (whether designed as components or
functionally integrated). Furthermore, by its nature, the global information
system can support an automated ABM system, even one deployed on multiple
continents. In 1994, at the international conference, “Modern Systems for
Defense Against Ballistic Missiles,” I read a paper titled, “The Global
Information System for International Security and Integration with National
ABM Systems,” which, on a conceptual level, laid out the purposes and
principles for constructing such a system. As related to today’s situation,
they may be summarized as follows.
The Global information system for international security (GIS IS)
may fall
under the jurisdiction of some collective organization of interested
countries, or a special committee of the UN. Its integration with national
ABM systems would permit it to perform international (allied) tasks without
violation of countries’ sovereignty. It would likewise raise the
effectiveness of national ABM systems in deflecting missile attacks.
The global character of this information system facilitates the
unlimited
expansion of protected territory, which in turn provides for an open coalition
for new countries, first and foremost, those on the Eurasian Continent.
International tasks for the GIS IS include:
-- Obtaining information required for preemptive action. That
is, detecting
indications of proliferation, modernization and testing of missiles by
monitoring all types of missile launches from any point on the globe,
identifying and cataloging them, and also identification of countries
violating international agreements.
-- Obtaining telemetry from ballistic missile launches together with
“friend-foe” signals, as required for international retaliatory action, in
accordance with approved rules. Such actions may include destruction of
missiles in flight in the absence of information about their launch,
suppression of launch sites, etc.
Tasks performed in concert with the national missile defenses of
attacked
countries include:
-- Early warning about missile launches aimed at a given country.
-- Transmission of real-time data for targeting weapon systems for
extraatmosperic or atmospheric interceptors, whether located on the territory
of the attacked countries or within a theater of combat action.
Information capabilities of GIS IS must be commensurate with the
supposed
threat. In part, the requirements for selection of targeting means in open
space can be reduced, as the system’s satellites need not be battle hardened,
and so on. These and similar measures significantly reduce the system cost
and make it possible to construct it with existing technologies.
GIS IS is a collectively operated system. Therefore, its
fielding must be
cooperative from the start, and Russia’s participation is fully justified.
Our country has useful experience in the development of space based systems of
global scale. For example at the height of the Cold War, based on the 1979
Memorandum of Understanding between the USSR, US, France and Canada, we
developed and launched the satellite system “Kospas-Sarsat,” designed to
locate ships and aircraft lost to accidents.
An agreement on the creation of GIS IS, if it is reached, will
represent the
movement of the problem of balancing strategic offensive weapons and defensive
systems from the plane of bilateral Russian-US relations to the multilateral;
a change that better fits our espoused paradigm for a multipolar world.
U.S. NMD UNLIKELY
TO BE EFFECTIVE ANYTIME SOON, GENERAL SAYS.
Major General Vladimir Belous, the director of the Moscow Center for International and
Strategic Studies, told ITAR-
TASS on 28 February that for the next 10 to 15 years the American national missile defense
(NMD) system will have
"more of a political than a military significance" for Russia because the
systems the U.S. will be able to build and deploy
"will not be very effective." Another view on such defense came from Duma deputy
(Yabloko) Aleksei Arbatov, who told
Interfax on the same day that if Moscow succeeds in securing U.S. agreement on the
creation of a non-strategic missile
defense in Europe, that could lead to Russia's integration into NATO. PG (RFERL_1 March
2001
U.S.
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ADVANTAGEOUS FOR RUSSIA - EX-DIRECTOR OF
FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (JRL – Feb 27, 2001)
MOSCOW. Feb 26 (Interfax) -
American plans to deploy a national missile defense system comply with Russian
strategic security interests, Nikolai Kovalyov, deputy head of the Duma
security committee and ex-director of the Federal Security Service, told Interfax on
Monday.
The idea is paradoxical "only at first sight," he
remarked.
The American plans have
triggered concern in some European countries and Russia,
but not a single missile defense system can be 100% efficient, Kovalyov
said.
This means that the enemy can destroy only eight out
of every ten strategic missiles and two will
hit their targets and inflict irreparable damage on any country,
the lawmaker said.
"This is pure theory," and the
actual percentage of destroyed missiles will be much lower, he said.
"Therefore, the American deployment of a
national missile defense system as a shield from a hypothetical aggression on the
part of Russia is absolutely senseless on a par with a similar missile defense
system in any other country," Kovalyov noted.
"If the United States has a spare $100 billion,
the president has the right to decide how to dispose of the money - either to
bury it or to launch it into space. A rich country can afford that," he said.
Kovalyov also said that the U.S. national
missile defense system would break the balance of political forces in the world.
"Therefore, anti-American feelings will mount in
Europe. In fact, the U.S.' move would drive Russia to common Europe by
making it think about general security in Europe, which complies
with the national interests of our country," he said.
*******
_________
________________________________________________________________________
Foreign Policy
Full text of
President Putin’s speech in the Russian Foreign Ministry on January 26, 2001
26.01.01. 17:18
Esteemed Igor Sergeyevich! Esteemed members of the Collegium! Dear friends!
I am indeed glad for having the possibility to be in the Foreign Ministry and participate in your work today. There have been many major international activities in the past month - activities that compelled us to work according to a very intense schedule.
Today's conversation offers a possibility to sum up certain results and define the range of tasks that confront us.
Our national interests in the international arena have been spelled out in the new concept of our foreign policy that has just been presented by the Foreign Minister. They correlate with the tasks in the sphere of defense and national security, with ensuring the social-economic development of Russia.
Probably for the first time in quite a long period, we have a clearly defined, general state strategy in respect to foreign policy and security. I consider it exceptionally important that in our current work we have managed to test our conceptual foreign policy approaches, and on the whole, we have managed to convert them into coordinated work performed by many bodies of state authority, public organizations and business circles.
The problems that Russia is encountering in the world today - and you know that better than anyone else - are serious and large in scope. In conditions of the mounting globalization, about which so much is being said today, our country has to find its place in the world.
In that context, our strategic course is aimed at integrating into the world community. It is aimed at developing a broad political dialogue and mutually advantageous cooperation with all who want and who are ready to cooperate with us.
The priority task here is to create around Russia a stable and secure situation, to create such conditions that would allow us to maximally concentrate efforts and resources towards the solution of the social-economic tasks facing the state.
It is understandable that today the arsenal of means by way of which we can influence the international situation is, objectively, not as great as we would like it to be. And in these conditions, the significance of forecasting the development of the situation in the main directions of our foreign policy increases many times. And especially where there still is quite a conflicting potential - the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, certain other regions of the world.
A most important direction in diplomatic work is to ensure strategic stability. This concerns stability and predictability in respect to the further development of international relations.
The fact that Washington has so far put off its decision on deploying a national missile defense system confirms that if one acts with purposefulness and with thought, looking ahead - of course, with due consideration for the interests of our partners - it is possible to achieve real positive results.
This is what I would like to add in connection with these problems. We have ratified START-II (when I see "we" I have in mind our country), as well as the Universal Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Russia did that what the international community had been expecting from us long ago - that, I shall not say demanded, but in any case, insisted on such a step on the part of Russia. We did that. Now we are waiting for the other side to take steps.
And I do not think that the overwhelming majority of the participants in international discourse are interested in Russia's unilateral disarmament. On the contrary, as I see it, this would have done irreparable harm to the contemporary architecture of these very same international relations.
This year we shall be in for painstaking and delicate work with our partners with the aim of preserving the 1972 treaty. A recent statement by the leadership of the administration of the newly elected president of the United States suggests that this dialogue may be positive. We are eagerly looking forward for such join work. It is also important that have learned to defend our interests firmly but by no means by way of confrontation. In this connection I would like to note the following: quite often we find ourselves in a situation where we somehow shy away from confronting our partners with awkward problems because we assume beforehand that they will prove unacceptable. Doubtless, it is necessary to know and take account of the position of the other side but it is necessary to be fully aware of the main reference-point: well-conceived national interests of our own.
Our country has to contend with a whole range of pressing issues, including regional conflicts, separatism, terrorism, runaway migration, organized crime and others. I would like to make a special point of stressing the danger of international terrorism and fundamentalism of absolutely any type. We have said many times - so much so, in fact, that this has even become part of international parlance - that it is quite obvious that a terrorist international community is taking shape, and in that respect we and our partners must streamline and coordinate our efforts. We have a direct stake in helping to create effective mechanisms of international cooperation in all directions.
Economic diplomacy should account for a growing share of work at the Foreign Ministry and other foreign departments. On the whole, there is still a good deal of untapped economic potential in the economic sphere. Sometimes the Foreign Ministry's central staff does not have a full command of the situation regarding trade and economic ties. I'd like to remind you of the fact that a most important instrument has long been at your disposal - the presidential decree on the Foreign Ministry's coordinating role in the conduct of an effective foreign policy. It is possible to use this instrument to much greater advantage than has been the case so far. It is necessary to build a system of promoting and protecting our economic interests abroad which could securely maximize the pay-off effect of the Russian economy and minimize risks in the way of our integration into the world economy. In my judgement, it is vitally important for the foreign-policy department to pay closer attention to the most important economic projects in keeping with national interests. It is necessary to make efforts to create such conditions for our entrepreneurs abroad which could be at least as good as those enjoyed by foreign businessmen in Russia. To that end it is of course necessary to know what conditions for foreign businesses there are in Russia. Somewhat later I am going to speak about the fact that the diplomatic corps is not properly informed about processes going on in our country.
Another aspect is the need to help our regions, notably Siberia and the Far East, to access world markets. Incidentally, as far as this problem is concerned, it is especially important to set in motion the mechanisms of close coordination both with local administrations and regional leaders and presidential representatives in the federal districts. I would like to stress here that ignorance of the problems of one's own country could lead to fatal mistakes.
Now a few words about the geography of our foreign policy. Commonwealth countries are our absolute priority.
Russia remains a natural - and it is understood by everyone - natural nucleus of the integration processes going on in the Commonwealth. But such integration, simply as a process, is not and en in itself; we don't need it this way. We don't need it as a slogan, or as a signboard. It should be really useful for our country and for our citizens. It is in this vein that we have held regular meetings of the State Council of the Union State and the Council of the CIS Heads of State. The outcome of these summits has shown that this approach is most effective in a dialogue with our partners. It is not only acceptable to them - they are interested in it themselves. Practically during my every visit to the countries of the Commonwealth I meet with people of the Russian-language community. And, I should say, a good deal of criticism is leveled at our work in this sphere. It concerns not only the diplomatic service; it concerns the efforts taken by the state in this sphere as a whole. But it concerns the diplomatic service as well, in political and information terms and in work conducted directly with people. We do obviously not enough to protect our Diaspora, to protect Russian culture and the Russian language. Millions of people who found themselves separated from their motherland are not to blame. We should proceed from this fact. I understand that working with people requires much effort, much patience and tact. An immense burden lies on the consular service. But such is the specific character of the activities of diplomats in the CIS countries. Special training and special human qualities are required for this.
There is a lot to be done in the European direction, which is traditionally the most important for us. Complex and dynamic processes are going on in Europe today. European structures are being transformed and the role of big European organizations and regional forums is changing. In this context, the importance of our relations with the European Union is doubtlessly growing. To be sure, we do not set ourselves a goal of joining the EU, but we should seek ways of cardinally promoting cooperation and improving its quality. Some problems confronting Russia in the Baltic States and in the Central and Eastern Europe obviously fall out of the general contest which is on the whole favorable. The Foreign Ministry has reserves to be used in this work as well. The evening out of our relations with Poland may serve as an example.
Time has come to think hard how to improve the situation in some other areas.
Normalization of relations with the North Atlantic alliance is not going easily. After the events in the Balkans they have been thrown back. Not through our fault, I am sure. At present, the fabric of interaction is gradually been restored. NATO is a real entity in European and world policy, and if we manage to establish relations with it in a spirit of sincerity, openness and constructive interaction, this will be a substantial contribution to European stability, and to our own security. I should like to stress here that it is in the context of our state's interests. Nevertheless, we still consider erroneous the line of NATO's expansion and we say openly about rejecting it in principle in a dialogue with the alliance.
The Asian direction is gaining increasing significance. I will say outright - I believe it would be wrong to measure where we have more priorities, in Europe or in Asia. There must not be a Western or an Eastern preference. The reality is that a power with such a geopolitical position as Russia has national interests everywhere. This line should be consistently pursued. We should get a firm foothold in all Asian affairs.
The road to this, among other things, lies through the intensification of our participation in the main integration structures of the Asia Pacific region and, what is no less important, through the consistent expansion of friendly relations and practical cooperation with the leading Asian states, with our neighbors in the first place, of course.
I would like to speak separately on a matter, which, I am certain, must become a central one for the Foreign Ministry and our diplomatic representations. I mean assistance to a positive outlook on Russia abroad. For the time being the situation in this sphere is far from favorable. I will not particularly enlarge on it, for you are aware of what is happening in this sphere as well as I am. Of course, I think, someone is still benefiting from cultivating the image of a dangerous Russia. This helps justify both a course for building up the military might and the use of force in international affairs. But, thank God, in my view, the understanding of the fact that Russia has gone through a qualitative change is asserting itself rather firmly in the world at large. And this, undoubtedly, is influencing the character of international relations today. We only must use it competently and subtly in our work. And not simply use it, but advance it further. A struggle for influence over public moods abroad becomes one of the more pointed and pressing foreign policy problems. We must drastically raise the level of work in this sector. It is necessary to use for this all available levers: media publications, broader contacts between public organizations, propaganda for the achievements of our culture and science. In particular I would like to draw your attention to the necessity of a more active work with representatives of foreign media. Employees of the Ministry of Foreign Relations must explain Russia's position on all problems arising both inside and outside the country.
Later I would like to say a few words behind the closed doors, but in conclusion of this part of my address I think it important and necessary to note that we worked in accordance with a very tense timetable last year. One may say, we were repairing an omission.
Yevgeny
Primakov suggests two scenarios as to how world may develop
06.02.01. 16:34
Isolationism for Russia must be totally excluded, declared Yevgeny Primakov at the first meeting this year of the Council on foreign and defense policies on Monday, February 5. Isolationism is counterproductive as compared to an active stand aimed at acquiring supporters in any direction of activity so long as this is in line with the country's national interests.
Primakov holds that globalization must not be allowed to influence the dismemberment of states or to encourage separatism in any parts of the planet. Today, the academician pointed out, the Soviet formula "self-determination right up to secession" must not be allowed to work since this could lead to the reexamination of many borders and to chaos. This is also dangerous in view of the growing Muslim solidarity that has a negative component - extremism and international terrorism.
Globalism or globalization, he continued, must help in resolving international crisis problems, in diminishing the nuclear threat and averting the brain drain, rather than vice versa.
In this context, Primakov considers there are two scenarios that may unfold in the international arena in the future. The first is when NATO-centrism predominates along with the growing influence of that organization and the United States as its leader. Such a tendency will neutralize the UN and other international organizations and will squeeze Russia out of the integration process in the western direction and compel it to rally more closely with China and India. Such a tendency could lead to confrontation at various levels.
The second possible scenario is when the aspirations of the USA and NATO for monopoly "dissolve" in the aspirations of other states for a multipolar world. In this case, the integration of Russia and other countries in the world community will proceed smoothly, while the role of the UN will be decisive. Then it will be possible to funnel the efforts of many states towards solving the problems standing before the poor countries of the world. In this case, Russia will not be playing the last role in this historical process.
Primakov maintains that the United States and other western countries practically did not help Russia with anything during the course of its reforms, but they pumped out a great deal from Russia. Suffice it to recall the flight of finances and intellectual potential to the West.
It is his opinion that Russia must surmount the mistakes that were made by young reformers at the initial stage of the reforms, restore the rule of law in all directions so as not allow abuses under cover of the Constitution.
The academician believes that Russian President Vladimir Putin correctly understands the situation in which the country has found itself and that the president is capable of establishing proper ties between state regulating levers and market chaos. True, for this, he must make a clean break from those who named him the successor.
© http://www.strana.ru./.
CIA director
exaggerates threat from Russia, political scientist declares
Strana.ru 08.02.01. 17:25
CIA director George J. Tenet's statement that Russia will have space offensive systems
already by 2015 most likely had selfish motives behind it, Vyacheslav Nikonov, a prominent
Russian political scientist, says.
Statements of this kind, he points out, "are quite typical of U.S. intelligence, which kept exaggerating over the half a century of its existence the threat coming from the Soviet Union."
"However," Nikonov adds, "presenting an enemy in demonic features, far more demonic than he really is, is a ruse to which most intelligence services resort to increase their own financing. If the enemy is menacing, artful and insidious, then more money is needed to oppose such an enemy."
As for the capability of Russian means of combating U.S. space-based systems, the Americans' apprehensions may be well justified, Nikonov believes. Russia is "unlikely develop space attack systems, but it is quite easy for it to produce means of destroying the space systems of another side. Moreover, such means already exist."
Nikonov sees nothing new in the fact that the CIA chief has again listed Russia among the enemies of the U.S. "It is common knowledge that the U.S. intelligence service regards Russia as among the countries it should concentrates on to the greatest extent," the political scientist says, adding that of late U.S. spending on intelligence has even increased.
"Objectively speaking, Tenet is absolutely right to say that our nuclear missile capability presents a threat to America," Nikonov goes on. He recalls that Russian missiles are "the only thing today which can destroy the United States." But stating this again by the CIA director is an absolute platitude in the quarters of the highest U.S. strategic leadership, and in no way does it prove that a cold snap set in in relations between our countries."
© National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000.
Russia’s
Foreign Ministry disagrees with CIA director’s “grim revelations”
Strana.ru 09.02.01. 17:25
Russia's Foreign Ministry is "baffled, to put it mildly" by CIA Director George
Tenet's claim that Russia poses a threat to the United States.
The Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department says in a statement circulated on February 9 that "considering the specific fact that the CIA thrived during the Cold War, its head can hardly be expected to give balanced assessments in regard to us." Despite "differences in our approaches to a number of major international issues" Moscow still regards Washington as an important partner of Russia in the joint maintenance of international security and strategic stability. That is the reply of the Russian foreign-policy department to Tenet's claim that Russia is trying to counter U.S. interests on a global scale.
The statement stresses that Russia and the United States no longer pose a threat to each other or regard each other as adversaries. Moscow believes the new U.S. leadership shares this fundamental view.
The Foreign Ministry is surprised by Tenet's "forced attempts" to portray Russia as "one of those responsible for the proliferation of weapons of mass annihilation and means of their delivery." It says the CIA director must be well aware of the fact that Moscow has fully ratified the START-2 Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty. It has also played a crucial role in the preservation of the cornerstone treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. The Foreign Ministry gives a reminder that on November 13, 2000, Russia's president suggested an integral program for real nuclear disarmament, which is also designed to strengthen all key non-proliferation regimes, including missiles and missile technologies.
Russia's Foreign Ministry maintains that Tenet's
"grim revelations" "in no way correspond to the real state of affairs and
the priorities of Russo-American cooperation formulated by the presidents of Russia and
the United States at this particularly crucial juncture of the development of relations
between the two countries."
© National Information Service Strana.Ru, 2000.
MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA
General Manilov
advises NATO on Russia’s military reform
Strana.ru
28.02.01.
Addressing an ambassadorial meeting of the Russia-NATO Joint Council (JC) in Brussels
February 28, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General
Valery Manilov described plans for a military reform in the Russian Armed Forces. He
focused on stages of the reform within the framework of tasks outlined by the President of
the Russian Federation.
The NATO side for its part informed him about the results of the February 27 meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign ministers, which was attended by the new U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell.
Besides, the JC as usual considered the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. It also discussed the sides' cooperation in peacekeeping operations. Issues figuring on the JC joint working plan were addressed as well.
First reductions in
Russian army to get under way shortly
Strana.ru
28.02.01.
Action is being taken on a plan for military reform approved by the president in January 2001. The plan covers the period until the year 2005.
Reform directives have been sent to units stationed in the Far East, Siberia, the Kaliningrad region, the Trans-Caucasus and the Dniester republic making it mandatory for them to carry out reform before April 1, 2001. A total of 1,000 army units are subject to cuts now, or 70% of the cuts to be made before 2005. The haste stems from the fact that the money earmarked for reform should be spent within a prescribed time limit.
The cuts will not affect combat capability. They will be offset by a troop build-up in Russia's south, notably on Russia's border with Kazakhstan where military infrastructure is virtually non-existent. Measures envisaged under the 2001-2005 plan are also to optimize the present military setup there.
Cantonments will no longer be financed by the Defense Ministry - they will be handed over to local administrations, organizations of the sporting and technological society working for defense, the Interior Ministry and the like. Considering that the cuts will reduce the significance of military airfields, they will be guarded by commandants' companies and military installations by civilian units.
The cuts will make thorough-going inroads into the troops stationed in Siberia. They will affect the staff and units of the 41st Army now stationed in the area where the Siberian Military District was stationed before its merger with the Trans-Baikal Military District. Preparations are being made for the merger of the Volga and Urals Military Districts but it is not yet clear whether the merger will take place in 2001.
More than ten army units totaling more than 8,000 servicemen will be cut in the Kaliningrad region before the year 2003.
The numerical strength of troops in the Dniester Republic and Trans-Caucasus is also to be cut. Cuts will affect military infrastructure, which is being handed over to local administrations.
According to some reports, the headquarters of Russian troops in the Trans-Caucasus will be moved to Armenia. Even the media are to be reformed under the military plan: Russian military newspapers Fatherland's Soldier (Tiraspol) and Trans-Caucasian Military Records (Tbilisi) are to be closed down before April 1.
How the Russian army is being reformed
Strana.ru
28.02.01. 15:22
The question of reforming cardinally the military organization of the state was raised at the meeting of Russia's Security Council on August 11 last year. It was decided then to cut the Russian Armed Forces by over 350,000 persons.
Seven more power agencies agreed late in September that a reform was inevitable. And only the leadership of the Emergencies Ministry, the Federal Border Service, and the Interior Troops command still had some doubts. Ultimately they, too, accepted the idea of making radical cuts.
At the Security Council meeting on November 9, President Vladimir Putin said a final decision was to be taken on the military organization of the state. After t the reform, he said, Russia should have a more compact and therefore a more effective professional army.
Finally the Security Council passed a decision on a military reform, which envisages, in particular, a reduction by 600,000 people within five years (470,000 servicemen and 130,00 civilians employed in the Armed Forces), including 20,000 troops of the Interior Ministry, 10,000 railway troops and 5,000 border troops. At the same time, the combat component should remain unchanged, since reductions are to be made in the rear and administrative sections of the armed forces.
By 2005 the total strength of servicemen and the civilians employed for the armed forces will be cut by 19.7%, which will allow to double the financing for every serviceman by 2005 and to triple it by 2010, since the budget allocations for different military and army-related ministries and departments will remain unchanged.
The chief purpose of the reform is to improve the social maintenance system for servicemen.
The planned personnel cuts are called for by a number of economic reasons. Over the past years, 70% of defense allocations was spent away by the personnel and only 30% was used for perfecting combat training and development of new types of arms. For economic reasons, too, Russia is incapable of waging a large-scale war by conventional arms until 2010. So, to retain strategic stability and prevent a possible aggression in the coming decade Russia may rely only on its nuclear capability.
The defense industry is to be somewhat reorganized as well. In the first half of 2001 the problems of restoring the military-industrial complex will be given a thorough study.
During the military reform in Russia the number of army generals will be reduced in proportion to general cuts in the armed forces, and 200 generals will have to leave the armed forces.
Who will reform Russian army?
Strana.ru
28.02.01.
The plans for carrying out a military reform in Russia do not rule out the possibility that a civilian may become the defense minister. What is more, the functions of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff will be absolutely separate. These transformation plans are based on Western principles of military construction, or to more precise, on the American system. Yet it is necessary to point out that there are very few candidates who could fit the bill of civilian defense minister.
Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov is seen as the No. 1 candidate. First of all, he hails from St. Petersburg and this means he is from the President's team. Second, he earned himself a reputation in the past as a specialist in the military-industrial complex: he was in charge of that complex in the past and he supervises it at present. Moreover, the future function of the Defense Ministry as the general contractor of all defense industry products for the needs of all so-called power structures lies within the competence of the Deputy Prime Minister. True, from unofficial sources, Strana.Ru has learned that Klebanov himself has absolutely no desire to become defense minister. In fact, he is prepared, even if such an order comes down from the top, to tender his resignation.
Candidate No. 2 is Sergei Ivanov currently the Secretary of Russia's Security Council. Ivanov as defense minister is not a very strong move but one that is hardly possible due to a number of circumstances. Not only the Defense Ministry needs to be shored up. This also holds true for all the rest 12 power structures that are coordinated by the Security Council. That is why Sergei Ivanov as head of the Security Council carries much more clout than Ivanov as the leader of one of the power structures.
Candidate No. 3 is Andrei Nikolayev currently head of the Duma's defense committee and former director of the Federal Border Guards Service. Nikolayev lately has been a very active figure in the military lobby in the Duma. He is publicly criticizing the current (military) reform. He maintains that proceeding from the figures reflecting the current funding of the army, nothing good is coming out of the military transformations. However, outside the law on alternative service, he has so far tabled nothing systemic although his current post obliges him to do so.
Nikolayev is a friend of the Yeltsin family, and he is extremely ambitious. It was precisely he who began reforming the Federal Border Guards Service that he viewed not quite correctly as being "the main force in the country." It was he who tabled the initiative to build all of Russia's military and strategic intelligence on the basis of his Border Guards. These initiatives were short-lived, but in Yeltsin's time Nikolayev managed nevertheless to do something for "his" service. Present-day Nikolayev is the opposition to the current Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin who until recently was also seen as one of the candidates for the chair of defense minister.
Kvashnin's service career began as a lieutenant in the regular army and he now holds the rank of army general. He wants to become defense minister. But when Igor Sergeyev was appointed to that post, Kvashnin almost immediately became the main opposition force. A little later Kvashnin elaborated a plan for military reform (an alternative to Sergeyev's plan). In this plan, there was no room for the Defense Minister's "pet" - the Strategic Missile Force (SMF). And last summer this spilled over into a public scandal between the two commanders. In the event that Kvashnin gets a promotion, this could trigger a "foxy" struggle for the post of Chief of the General Staff that retains real control over the armed forces.
It was back in the summer of last year that the Naval Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov was regarded, according to unofficial information, as one of the contenders for the chair of defense minister. In fact, Vladimir Putin even found the time to be present when the admiral was defending his dissertation for a doctorate's degree.
The "Kuroyedov as defense minister" variant would have been quite logical also from the point of view of the "rotation" theory that exists in this country's military circles. It is considered that in conditions of insufficient financing of the armed forces, the development of each of the services could take place only in turns. The three previous defense ministers were Shaposhnikov of the Air Force, Grachev of the Airborne Troops, Sergeyev of the SMF. However, the Kursk submarine disaster wrote finis to the Navy commander's hopes of becoming defense minister, but he can become Chief of the General Staff.
SMF Commander Vladimir Yakovlev can also vie for the post of Chief of the General Staff. He has gone through all the stages of the career ladder. Besides that, he has graduated from three military academies and has more systemic vision of the problem in view of his missile background.
There are two more worthy contenders for the post of Chief of the General Staff - Airborne Troops commander Georgy Shpak and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Yury Baluyevsky
The former was able to protect his Airborne Troops from reduction for which he earned considerable respect from his subordinates. Moreover, he has seen action in the battlefields, and he is excellent physical shape. But there are minuses: even without that, the Airborne Troops are considered to be an especially privileged service. In the event of their further beefing up (in case Shpak becomes Chief of the General Staff) this could cause disgruntlement in the other services.
The latter has a reputation of being a very surefooted general when
it comes to strategic and operative planning. He worked out the tactics of action against
the Chechen bandit units during the current anti-terrorist campaign. The only thing that
can be held against him if Kvashnin does not become defense minister is that he gave
active backing to the "Kvashnin" reform.